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ABSTRACT 
A formal logic--588~ for Relative Evidential Support is proposed based on the 
following ideas: 
1. Arguments are represented direct(y and are taken as the terms for ~5 °. By 
arguments we mean the relationships between two judgments expressing that one 
supports or refutes the other, ie, evidential supports; 
2. Comparisons between arguments are used as carriers for their relative strengths. 
By comparisons we mean relationships between two arguments with respect o 
their strengths. 
3. Uncertainty reasoning is viewed as a process of three phases of." 
• evidence structure construction; 
• evidence accumulation; 
• decision-making. 
Some examples are presented showing how ~qZ~S: can be used to represent various 
kinds of uncertain information such as: 
• the relative strengths of evidential supports, eg, evidence 1 supports conclusion PI 
better than evidence 2 supports P2; 
• belief unctions, eg. evidence I is exhausted by stating a belief unction with mass 
function m l; 
• necessity assertions, eg, the necessity function derived from the membership 
function f of predicate F on domain D; 
• probability assertions, eg, the probability that statement s is true is. 99. 
These examples illustrate the advantages o f f ,S :  over other representations of uncer- 
tain information and evidential reasoning, eg, 
1. it is based on relative strengths of arguments that cannot be represented using any 
absolute measures; 
2. It is capable of representing explicitly the design of evidence [21]; 
3. It can represent many kinds of absolute measures--in doing so it has the merit 
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that it explicates the assumptions and requirements for using different kinds of 
measurements of uncertainty; 
4. it provides a natural common base for a hybrid system. 
Our conclusion is that~qPS"S a is a suitable formalization for uncertain information. 
KEYWORDS: relative evidential support, uncertainty 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty, arising from the limitation of our knowledge as well as the 
complexity of the practical world, has been widely acknowledged as a very 
important aspect of a human being's reasoning ability. Studies of uncer- 
ta inty-of  its various representations and the reasoning processes associ- 
ated with them--have provided a focus for research in many areas, 
especially in the area of artificial intelligence. 
We model uncertainty as a property associated with arguments. By 
arguments we mean evidential supports, the kind of relationships between 
pairs of statements hat express that one of the statements, if granted, will 
support or refute the other. That is, an argument is composed of a 
presumption (statement) and a conclusion (statement) such that the argu- 
ment is enforced only when its presumption is granted and the effect of its 
enforcement is to support its conclusion. This support has a certain 
strength. Its strength might not be very great and this indicates the 
uncertainty of the argument. For example, bird(x) supports fly(x), but the 
strength of this relationship is not very great, eg, it is not as strong as 
bird(x) A penguin(x) supports not-fly(x). The concept of strength is left a 
little vague for the time being. 
In the literature, uncertainty is usually reflected as a property of 
statements, eg, (statistical or subjective) probability assertions in proba- 
bilistic languages and logics [14, 15, 2, 7, 12]; fuzzy truth values and their 
derivations, possibilities and necessities [23]; etc. Belief functions [19, 8], 
although intended to represent he strength of evidence, belong to this 
category as well. 
This treatment of uncertainty has its justifications [4], but it is not always 
appropriate. In most cases, uncertainty is a property of an argument 
instead of a property of a statement. For example, it is very appropriate to 
say that "bird(x) supports f ly(x) to a degree of .99," where the number .99, 
representing the strength of the argument "being a bird supports being 
able to fly," is a property of the argument and not of either statement. If
we trace this statement down to another level, we should see that the 
strength of the argument is derived from some observation or our statisti- 
cal knowledge, something like "99% of birds can fly." Obviously if we say 
that the belief degree of fly(Tweety) is .99 upon the observation 
bird( Tweety ), there is a implied step of conversion that converts the 
~'g'SP-A Logic for Relative Evidential Support 207 
strength of the argument to be the measurement of its conclusion state- 
ment. But although it might sometimes be justifiable to take the strength 
of an argument as the uncertainty measurement of the conclusion state- 
ment of the argument, in many cases it is not. In fact, in cases where we 
know nothing relevant, or we don't know enough relevant information to 
satisfy the presumption of argument, he argument is not applicable; in 
situations where we know more than required, more considerations may 
lead us to some other arguments that make this argument irrelevant, 
either by overwhelming the conclusion of this argument, eg, that penguins 
do not fly overwhelms that birds fly, or by enforcing the conclusion of this 
argument, eg, penguins having legs transcends birds having legs; and only 
in the case when we know nothing more and nothing less than the 
presumption of the argument, or in the case when we know some more but 
the additional knowledge is irrelevant to the conclusion of the argument, is 
it justifiable to convert argument strength into conclusion strength. It is 
hard to find any reason to suggest hat it should always be justifiable, 
especially as modeling the strength of an argument, without converting it
to the strength of the conclusion statement of the argument, has not been 
exploited. In addition, we believe that modeling uncertainty as a property 
of an argument rather than as a property of a statement has the advantage 
of explicating the implied conversion. For example, we will be able to 
discuss the conditions under which the conversion should be granted 
(which is certainly not simple at all [11, 10]). Taking uncertainty as a 
property of a statement has many problems such as commitment (or 
non-commitment) [17]. For example, changing probability (a kind of mea- 
surement of our belief) has to be viewed as a nonmonotonic process (ie, 
one that changes what is reached) even though it is the most normal thing 
in evidential reasoning. 
So we take strength to be a property of each argument, hough some- 
times it can be embodied as a property of its conclusion. And, the 
strengths of arguments are in general uncertain. Some arguments are so 
strong that their conclusions are always granted whenever their presump- 
tion judgments are granted and the arguments are applicable. These 
arguments can be appropiately called "certain arguments" and they are 
the entities studied in first order logic. But other arguments are not so 
strong and should be called "uncertain arguments." This is because in such 
cases, in contrast o certain arguments, even when some arguments are 
applicable they might be overwhelmed by other more powerful arguments 
with different or even contradictory conclusion sentences. Their conclu- 
sions, therefore, might also be overwhelmed by contradictory conclusions. 
For example, for this reason we should choose the most specific presump- 
tion (reference class) [12] on which to base our reasoning, because some 
arguments with less specific presumptions might be overwhelmed. 
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The strength of an argument is affected by many factors such as: how 
strong the presumption is; how weak the conclusion is; how strong the 
relationship between them is; the presence of other arguments; and how 
these factors are related. The factors and their complicated relationship 
make it extremely difficult (if not impossible) to measure (or even to 
define) the strength of arguments. Cohen's work [3] seems to be the only 
work focused on addressing the factors of the strength of arguments. Pearl 
[15] also makes some comments on them. In the literature, however, many 
methods are proposed to generate a single number as the absolute 
measurement of argument strength. 
But, for obvious reasons, doing this is too unrealistic an idealization and 
it has little justification, t Extending a single number to an interval [13, 7], 
or to a set of numbers [23], or supplementing a single number with higher 
order measurements can help. But this help is not very substantial [9, 22], 
and the essence remains as before. 
Between the detailed low level, where the factors contributing to argu- 
ment strength are addressed, and the abstract high level, where argument 
strength is summarized as a number or numbers, we advocate the intimi- 
date alternative of addressing the relative strength of arguments. This is the 
relationship between two arguments with respect o their strengths. Expe- 
rience shows that statements such as "this argument is more convincing 
than that" are among the most commonly used statements in our reason- 
ing process. 
We believe that comparing is really the process referred to when we are 
talking about weighing evidence. In fact, comparison is always a very 
practical means for making judgments whenever absolute measurement is 
not available or not suitable. For example, we can talk about beauty and 
judge one object is more beautiful than another with hardly any kind of 
measurements at all. At the same time, lack of suitable "ways of measure- 
ment is itself a very important source of uncertainty. At a meta level, 
comparisons are very important in the structure of our knowledge and are 
far more essential than measurement. To measure anything is of course, 
nothing other than to compare some attribute of the thing to some 
standard. Furthermore, even standards themselves are the results of the 
deepening of our understanding of some kinds of comparisons. To give a 
rather esoteric example, the transcendental numbers, ie, ~0,~1,... are 
defined in terms of comparisons--as equivalence classes of a relation = 
such that A = B means "set A has no more elements than set B and B 
1 Numbers, of course, are sometimes a very convenient or even pragmatic idealization of 
argument strength, but their idealized nature must be kept in mind. We will return to this 
point later. 
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has no more elements than A". For an example at a very practical evel, 
understanding of the nature and precision of many widely used standards, 
such as those for weight and length, is still developing. 
It is not surprising that the importance of comparison in judging the 
strength of evidence or uncertainty measures of statements is widely 
recognized in the literature. For example, its central role is emphasized by 
Sharer [20]: "On a practical evel, making probability judgments means 
assessing the strength and significance of one's evidence by fitting it into a 
scale of canonical examples." Much more surprising is the fact that no 
serious work on modeling comparisons as a representation for uncertain 
information can be found. 
In this paper, we propose a representation of uncertain information 
based on modeling arguments and their relative strengths, and argue it to 
be a suitable representation for uncertain information. The reasoning 
process using the representation is also given. 
In the following section, we describe the model that reflects our method 
of representing uncertain information and outline the stages of the reason- 
ing process. In section 3, we give the syntax and semantics of~q'g'dP--the 
logic for representing relative argument strength. Constraints on the 
relative argument strengths, represented as axioms for ~S '~, are also 
presented. In section 4, a few examples are given showing how to use~g'S p 
to represent various kinds of uncertain information. Discussions of the 
relationships oL9~5 p with other representations are given along with the 
exposition of examples which show that ~g '~ is a very flexible and 
powerful representation method. Finally, a summary is presented which 
wraps up this paper but initializes further studies. 
2. MODEL 
The semantic model of the method is based on two abstract spaces for 
making judgments (statements). One space is for evidence sensing and the 
other is for decision-making. Here we formalize the two spaces as two 
first-order logics. We denote the space for evidence sensing as ~e and the 
space for decision making as @.2 
Evidence (consisting of sentences in the first space) is related to choices 
(sentences in the second space) only via arguments such as "this evidence 
supports (or refutes) that choice." We denote an argument that "evidence 
e supports choice p" as (e, p) and will call such pairs "arguments from 
2 We suggest that -Ye and _~p be delineated in such a manner that the truth of sentences in 
.~. are readily available and the truth of sentences in ~ are what we want to seek. 
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to ~p,,.3 In (e, p), we will call e the presumption and p the conclusion. 
Thus, the word "argument" is taken to have the intuitive meaning "a step 
in reasoning" rather than having a mathematical meaning. 
It should be noticed that all arguments are conditioned, ie, an argument 
will not be enforced unless its presumption is satisfied. Thus, an argument 
(e, p)  should be read as "if the presumption e is satisfied, then there is an 
argument supporting the conclusion p." 
2.1. Structure for Evidence 
DEFINITION Let ~¢ be a set of arguments from ~e to ~p and ~ be any 
partial relation on ~, denoted by "~ ". Then, 4-tuple ~S a = 
( ~e,-~p, ~*¢, a~) is called an evidence structure if and onty if 
1. V(e,p)  ~¢.  
(e ,p)  ~ (e ,p) ;  
2. V(el, Pl), (ez, Pz), (e3, P3) ~ ~', if (e 1, Pl)  ~ (e2, P2) and 
(e2, p2) ~ (e3, p3), then 
(el ,p1) ~ (e3,P3); 
3. V(e, pl), (e, p2) ~,  ifp 1 --* P2 (Pl impliesp2 in ~p), then 4 
(e,pl )  ~ (e, p2); 
4. V(e, pl) ,(e2,p2) ~¢,  if (e I --* e 2) A ~(e 2 ~ e 1) (e 1 implies e2, 
and el, e 2 is not equivalent in S~), then 
(ez,p z) ~ (el,p1). 
5. V(el ,p l ) , (ez,p2) ~ ' ,  
(e 1 u e2,pl Up2). 
It can be noticed the that constraints on evidence structure are very 
simple. These constraints guarantee that our structure of evidence is 
consistent. We believe this requirement is necessary so that even if our 
observations and their implications hould be inconsistent in themselves 
or inconsistent with our knowledge, our knowledge itself should be 
consistent. 
As for the implications for these constraints, the first two constraints 
3 We omit arguments such as "evidence refutes choice p"  because they can be represented 
using (e, p )  in a natural way. 
4 Notice that the two arguments have a common presumption. 
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say that "~ " is a partial order relation on .x'. The third constraint 
requires that from the same presumption, a statement always commands 
no less support than any of its logical implications. If statements are 
viewed as representations for sets of alternatives, this constraint simply 
states that, by the same evidence, no subset can be supported better 
than its supersets. 
The fourth constraint specifies that no statement can enforce stronger 
support than any of its logical implications. This constraint is included 
because when e 1 ~ e2, we can say that e 1 is more specific than e z and 
contains more information. In such cases, we can say that information 
conveyed in e 2 is contained in that conveyed by ep Thus, all arguments 
based on e I can be viewed as based on something that has already taken 
into account everything e2 has to say. In this sense, the evidence space 
can be viewed as being layered--any thing said at a higher level contains 
or covers all things that can be said at a lower level, e I ~ e 2 means that 
el is at a higher level than e2. Thus, what said by e 2 should be weaker 
than that said by e x. e~ might have nothing more to say than e2, but if it 
does, these things are more defensible than those based on e z. In cases 
where these additional things based on e~ are consistent with those 
based on e2, knowing e~ enforces what has said. In cases where the 
additional things are inconsistent with those bases on e 2, the ones based 
el will overrule those based on e 2 because more considerations are 
commanded based on e~. 
For example, penguins do not fly though birds fly. Because when we 
are talking about penguins, their being birds has already been consid- 
ered, then any conclusions reached from penguin considerations have 
priority over these from only bird considerations. In this case, inconsis- 
tency arises but the desirable result should be that penguins don't fly 
based on the more specific consideration of penguins. 
For another example, penguins have legs; so do birds. This is a 
consistent situation where penguins having legs is supported by their 
being penguins and being birds. But obviously, no changes concerning 
only the legs of birds in general can affect this assertion. In this sense, 
because more specific considerations are available, less specific consider- 
ations are overshadowed and become irrelevant. 
On the other hand, special penguins may turn out to be legless or able 
to fly. 
Notice the symmetry in the last two conditions that the stronger the 
evidenced or the weaker the conclusions, the stronger the argument. 
In the relation 2 of an evidence structure g'5 ~, two arguments might 
not be related. But if they are, (el,p1) ~ (e2,p2) should be read as 
"argument (e 1, P l )  is no more believable (ie, no stronger) than argu- 
ment ( e 2 , P2 )." 
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2.2. Evidence Accumulation 
As noted before, all arguments are conditioned in the sense that 
argument (e, p)  can enforce its support for p only if e is satisfied. This 
provides us with a natural way to accumulate vidence on an evidence 
structure. 
Suppose our information allows us to issue a sentence in ~e, then we 
can identify a set of arguments composed of all arguments whose presump- 
tions are satisfied under e, ie, all applicable arguments. This set and 
relationships between arguments in this set, compose a sub-structure ~S:~ 
of ~S # for any sentence of ~ .  This sub-structure, defined as follows, is 
viewed as the result of evidence accumulation. 
DEFINITION Let ~S:= (~e, .~p,s / ,  ~9~) be an evidence structure and e 
be a sentence Of ~e. Then the sub-structure ~5,~ = (~ee,~p ,Z:e, ~q'e) of  
~S:  under evidence is defined as follows: 
2. 
3. sg e = {(e ,p ) l (e ' ,p )  ~g,e  ~e'};  
4. ~9~ e = ~9~ :3 (~¢e × ~¢e), ie, the sub-relation of  ~ on sg e. 
To guarantee the process of evidence accumulation, conditioning on an 
evidence structure has the following property. 
COROLL~Y 1 Let ~S:= (.Z:~,.~p,:C,~q~) be an evidence structure and 
e 1, e 2 be two sentences in 2 e such that e I ~ e 2. Then 
Ae 2 ~----~el. 
Proof The proposition is obvious because any argument triggered by e 2 
will also be triggered by e 1. • 
This proposition says that the set of triggered arguments will not contract 
with more evidence, ie, the triggered argument set will expand monotoni- 
cally with more evidence. But notice that ~elAe  2 = (~ex)e2 is not 
generally true, which means that evidence accumulation cannot be done 
cumulatively. Also notice that, as can be seen later in many examples, 
~q~g5: is non-monotonic of the conclusions it reached. 
Based on an evidence structure g '~ and evidence , a partial relation on 
can be defined with respect o how well a sentence is supported in g'S~. 
2.3. Decision-Making 
DEFINITION Let g',Y= ( -~,-~p,d,  a/,) be an evidence structure and e 
an item of  evidence, ie, a sentence in .~w. The comparing relation C on .~p 
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determined by ~,  denoted by "Pl < Pc", where Pa and P2 are two 
sentences in ~p, is defined as: 
1. in the case where there are arguments in s /  supporting some sentences 
P'1 such that p' 1 --> Pl, then 
def 
Pa <P2 = V(el,P'a) ~ , ( (P ' I  ~P l )  ~ (3(el ,P~) ~¢,  
t (P'2 ~P2 A (e~,p' 1) ~ (e2,p2)) ) ) ,  
2. in the case where there are no arguments supporting any sentence p'~ 
such that p' 1 ~ Pl, then 
def r 
Pl <P:  = 3(e2,P2) ~¢, (P2  ~P2-)  
Informally, the first formula states that if there are arguments supporting Pl 
or its subsets, ie, there are justifications for conclusion Pl, then we can say 
Pl is no more believable than p: if and only if for every justification for Pl, 
there exists at least one justification for p: and this justification (argument) 
is no worse than that justification for Pl. The second formula states that if 
there is no justification for conclusion pl, then we can say pl is no more 
believable than P2 if and only if p: has got some justifications. 
With this relation, which conclusion is better supported than another 
with respect o ~'S~e is clarified. Intuitive terms can be defined. 
DEVINmON Let c be a comparing relation on _~p and p~, p: be two 
sentences in .~,  then we say 
• p~ is less believable than p: iff 
Pl < P2 and P2 ~ Pl, 
• Pl is as believable as p: iff 
P l  --<P2 andp2 <p~; 
• Pl is not comparable to P2 iff 
Pl :~ P2 and P2 :~ Pl. 
From the relation so defined, decisions can be made based on the 
information embodied in the evidence structure and accumulated evi- 
dence. For example, we can determine whether a conclusion is better 
than another. Comparing a conclusion against its negation might be 
interesting, which leads to the following definition. 
DEFINITION A conclusion p is call a plausible conclusion supported by an 
evidence structure under evidence  if and only if -1 p is less believable than 
p. 
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Plausible conclusions o defined can be used to reflect many common 
sense inference patterns, some of them are shown in the examples in 
section 4.1. 
Alternative definitions of plausibility, and thus different ways of deci- 
sion-making, such as using the policy "choose the best" for any set of 
conclusions or providing some standard arguments as thresholds are also 
feasible. 
But more than that, why and how the decision is reached can be easily 
explicated, and this provides justifications for the results in cases where 
only the results are not convincing enough. 
In the following section, we specify our point of view. 
2.4. What Does An Evidence Structure Say? 
For pragmatic purposes, we don't make the assertion othing is true but 
The Whole, where The Whole is the complete truth of the world. We 
understand something and we have some knowledge. But at the same time, 
there is a lot about the world and about The Truth that we do not know or 
we do not know exactly. We have to make judgments based on what we do 
know and act on the judgments. The situation is like where we are 
observing a distant object and want to figure out its features. To begin 
with, we must know or understand some relationships between our obser- 
vations and the features of the object. Otherwise our observations are 
useless. Sometimes, we might not really know some relationships but 
believe them. At the same time, we know that some of these relationships 
are very accurate (or convincing) and some of them are less accurate. 
Generally speaking, these relationships have strengths of some kind. 
With knowledge as described above, we can make our observation. We 
are guided at this time by our knowledge that we are looking for observa- 
tions that we know or believe can be related to the features of the object. 
At the same time, we might assess the accuracy of these observations. 
As we make observations, ome of our knowledge may be triggered to 
give us justifications for predicating the features of the object. During this 
process, some predications might be overwhelmed by others with better 
justifications. 
In an evidence structure, in ~ we have observations we have made or 
are making and those we can expect; in .~p are the features of interest; 
and in ~', ~'  is our knowledge about the relation between ~e and ~e" 
The process of observing is the conditioning on an evidence structure, 
which decides what kind of knowledge should be triggered. 
As the last step, we weigh our arguments and make our decisions based 
on these applicable arguments and their relative strengths. 
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3. LOGIC 
Formulae in ~S p are composed of a binary predicate "a 1 ~ a2" in 
which a 1 and a 2 are two arguments. Intuitively, a~ ~< a 2 can be read as 
"argument a 1 is no more believable than argument a2". Using this 
predicate, complex argument structure can be built. 
The complexity o f ~  is embodied in the construction of an argument 
in which the evidential support relationships between pairs of statements 
are embodied. We begin with two first order logics ~e and 2p. Sentences 
in these are treated as terms and logical connectives are treated as sorted 
functions with which complex sentences in _~ and ~p are represented. An 
argument then is simply a pair (a sorted binary function) (e, p} where e is 
a sentence in .~  and p is a sentence in ~p. 
In this respect, ~S~ is very similar to Grosof's "Probabilistic Logic of 
order 1 (first order logic with a probability distribution on possible worlds)" 
[6]. But ~ 'S  p is based on two base logics .~  and ~ (first order logics) 
instead of only one. 
3.1. Syntax 
The syntax of 28"~ is very simple. We being with two first order logics. 
DEFINITION Let ~e and ~p be two first order logics with no common 
symbols. A pair ( e, p)  is called an (evidential support) argument from 
to -~p if and only if 
e ~2 e and p ~p.  
Then, treating arguments as terms, we can define an atom in~5 Q to be 
a statement specifying a relationship between two arguments. 
DEFINITION Let al, a 2 be two arguments. Then 
a 1 ~ a 2 
is an atom. 
In the following, we will denote (a 1 ~ a 2) A (a 2 ~ a 1) as a m -- a2, (a 1 
a 2) A -7(a 1 --~ a 2) as a 1 -< a 2. 
Apart from "~< ", we will also need another two predicates to carry the 
logical structure information in S¢ e and ~p respectively. We will use Te(e) 
to mean that e is a true sentence in Sae and Tp(p) to mean p is true in 4"  
Because ~<, T e, and Tp are first order predicates (after treating sen- 
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tences in .~, ~p and arguments as terms), the formulae in,9~S ° can be 
built in the manner conventional in the first order logic. 
EXAMPLE 1 Evidence supports conclusion p. 
We take this kind of statement to say that under evidence , conclusion 
sentence p is more believable than any sentence which implies p and is 
not equivalent to p. The corresponding ~9~5 '~formula of the example is: 
Vq(Tp((q --* p) A (q ~ p)) ~ (e,q)  -< (e ,p))  
In the following, we will denote this formula as S(e, p). 
3.2. Interpretation 
The interpretation also begins with the specification of ~e and .~p. 
Then the interpretation of a formula in ~q~'g'S: is composed of the interpre- 
tations of all sentences of both ~e and ~p. Since ~e and ~p have no 
common symbols, the combination is guaranteed to be sensible. 
DEFINITION Let S: e and .~p be two first order logics with no common 
symbols. Let a be a ~5:  formula and ~,  ~ be all sentences of ~ and 
_OWp appearing in a respectively. Then an interpretation I of a is defined as 
I. =re 
where Ie is an interpretation of ~ and Ip is an interpretation of ~ .  
The predicate symbol "4  ", the argument symbol (a function symbol) 
"( )" and logical connectives in ~ and _~p are all reserved symbols. 
3.3. Axioms 
We should include some axioms in our logic to guarantee that from any 
formula in~'~5:', a structure that satisfies the constraints for the definition 
of an evidence structure can be derived. The set of axioms is as follows. 
They are in accordance with the constraints on evidence structures. We 
will clarify this point later when we discuss the semantics of~%:S: formu- 
lae. 
Let Pl, P2, P3 be variables for sentences in .~p and e 1, e 2, e 3 be vari- 
ables for sentences on ~ and let ~ be a predicate. Then we have the 
following axioms: 
• Reflexive (e l ,P l )  ~ (el, p1); 
• Transitive ((el, P l )  ~ (e2,P2) A (e2,p2) ~ (e3,P3)) -* (el, p1) 
(e3,P3). 
• SuperChoice (Tp(p ~ q)) -~ ((e,p) ~ (e, q)); 
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• MoreEvidence (Te((e 1 ~ e 2) A ~(e 2 --* el))) ~ ((e2, P2) ~ (el, Pl)) ;  
• DisjunctEvidence S(el, Pl) A S(e2, P2) ---' S(el V e2, Pl V P2). 
All these axioms have intuitive appeal which corresponds to that of those 
constraints on evidence structure given in the last section. Recitation is 
omitted but section 2 may be referred to for the intuitive readings of these 
axioms. 
If we consider the extreme conditions of the evidence and the conclu- 
sion in arguments, these axioms give us some properties of ~ .  
COROLLARY 2 Let 1 e and lp be a true sentence in ~e and a true 
sentence in .~p respectively; let e be a sentence in ~e; and let pl, p2, p3 be 
sentences in S:p. Then 
(e, -11p) ~ (e ,p )  ~ (e, lp);  
( le ,P l )  ~ (e, P2) ~ ( -~ le ,P3) .  II 
Informally, the first property conveys the intuition that a false sentence 
cannot be supported better than any sentence and any sentence cannot be 
supported better than a true sentence. The second property reveals that a 
true statement (which carries no information) support he most weakly and 
a false sentence (which carries all information) support he most strongly. 
3.4. Semantics 
Any formula a in.gi'g'5: has two aspects. First, it is a first-order formula 
so that we can talk about inferences from it and the axioms (together with 
the axioms for first-order logic, using inference rules for first-order logic). 
In this respect, we can say whether a relationship between two arguments 
(or its negation) is derivable from the formula a. We will denote the fact 
that a tuple a I ~ a 2 (or ~(a  1 ~ a2)) is derivable from formula a as 
"a~ t-- (a 1 ~ a2)" (or "a  t- ~(a  1 ~ a2)"). 
Second, ~ is a special first order predicate so that it has some more 
semantics than determining a deductive relation. This additional semantics 
is that it also determines an evidence structure, or accurately, a conditional 
evidence structure because some sentences are rendered true under a. 
This conditioned evidence structure can be built as follows. 
Let a be an ,~'~S ~'formula and I be an interpretation of ~ based on 
~e and ~p. Then we have a 4-tuple ~'S:= (S:e, ~p,~¢, ~)  in which 
• ~g= {(e,p) le  ~.~,p  ~.~p,a  ~- Vq ~p,  Tp(q ~p)  ~ ( (e ,q )  -< 
(e, p)),}, ie, the set of arguments (e, p)  such that p is strictly more 
believable than all its subsets: 
• J/' = {a I ~ a21al, a2 ~s¢, a ~- (a I ~ a2)}, a relation composed of all 
relationships between arguments in ~ derivable from a. 
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From a, we also have a set E of all sentences which were rendered true 
under a, ie, 
E = {ela ~- T,(e)}. 
Let e' = /~ e ~ Ee, then the conditioned evidence structure determined by 
a is g'5~¢. 
Examples which show how ~'8"S a are used to represent real world 
statements are given in the next section. In the following, we state the 
relation between ~q'~S ~ formulae and evidence structures. 
It can be easily seen from the correspondence b tween the axioms for 
and constraints on evidence structure that for any formula a in ~8"S a, 
the structure constructed as above, called the evidence structure derived 
from the formula, satisfies the conditions for an evidence structure. On the 
other hand, it can also be easily seen that for any evidence strructure, 
there are formulae of ~q~8"S ~ from which the evidence structure can be 
derived. In this case, we say the formula represents the evidence structure. 
We put this as a theorem. 
THEOREM 1 From any ~8"5  # formula we can derive an evidence struc- 
ture. And for every evidence structure, there are formulae in o~'8"Y which 
represent i . • 
This ends our construction ofo~'8"S #. 
4. REPRESENTING EVIDENCE 
In the following subsections, we give some examples of how various 
kinds of uncertain information and their associated reasoning process can 
be represented using~'~S". 
In section 4.1, general examples are given. We show how some widely 
used arguments can be represented using,~8"d p and how evidential reason- 
ing can be conducted. In section 4.2, the idea of constructive evidence [21] 
is represented. We show that ~8"S" is capable of representing all relation- 
ships between evidence and conclusions that can be represented using 
belief functions. We have proved this statement by shown that all relation- 
ships carried in any belief function can be represented in.g~'8"~ using a 
special case ofo~'8~. We have also proved that the construction of belief 
functions from simple belief functions can be reflected using ~'~S" as well 
[1]. The proofs are omitted in this paper but the result is presented briefly. 
In section 4.3, it is shown that by using the idea of canonical examples 
(Shafer and Tversky [21]), absolute measures of different kinds can be 
represented. This can be achieved by introducing a set of canonical 
examples as representative of numerical degrees and including the axioms 
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associated with these degrees (in the definitions of these measurements) 
and then making type-assertion bycomparing an argument to some canon- 
ical examples. 
4.1. General Examples 
The statements made in the following examples can all be represented 
in ~W~w. 
EXAMPLE 2 Evidence  1 supports Pl no better than e 2 supports P2. 
This statement can be represented as the simplest formula (atom) of 
(el ,P1) ~ (e2,P2). 
Other relationships between arguments, as we noted before, can be 
represented as conventional expressions with ~ and logical connectives. 
EXAMPLE 3 Evidence refutes judgement p.
We take this statement as meaning that "e doesn't support p but supports 
all those statements which do not imply p." This makes sense because only 
relative strength of arguments i  concerned. So lowering the strength of one 
thing is equivalent to raising the strengths of all the others. 
( (e ,p )  = (e,Op)) A Vq(-~Tp(q ~p) )  ~ ( (e ,p )  -< (e ,q ) ) .  
In English, this can be read as "argument (e, p)  is empty and e supports q 
better than it supports p if q does not imply p" 
EXAMPLE 4 Evidence  1 is no more believable than e 2. 
We take this statement as a convention to mean "all arguments granted by 
el are no more believable than those granted by e2." 
Vpl ,pz ( (e l ,p l )  ~ (e2,P2)). 
EXAMPLE 5 "if A implies B, then knowing B is true makes A more 
plausible. But knowing B is false renders A false." 
Polya's excellent book [16] is one of the most important early works on 
plausible reasoning in which many patterns of plausible inferences in the 
context of mathematical reasoning are discussed. This example is one such 
pattern. 
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The example is represented using ~g 'S  ~ as follows. (S is the predicate 
defined in example 1). 
(VAe, Ap, Be, S((A e ---> Be) A Be), Ap) 
A V(Ae ,Ap ,ne , fe , ( (A  e --~Be) ABe,A  p) 
"< ( (A  e ---> Ce) A -'a Ce, -1Ze)  ). 
Informally, the ~ '~S '~ formula above states that every implication of A, if 
found true, will support A's being true. But such supports will be over- 
whelmed if any implication of A is found false. 
In the formula, Ae(E.~e) and Ap ~C2p are materially the same state- 
ment A. But we believe the difference between roles of A is significant 
that in ~e it is part of the evidence space helping the sensing of evidence 
and in .~p it is the statement whose truth we are seeking. 
The following two examples are commonly used in the literature of 
nonmonotonic logics [17, 5]. 
We show that using ~'~'S p, they can be represented elegantly, which 
suggests that relative strengths might provide a suitable semantics for 
defaults. 
EXAMPLE 6 Argument "quakers q(x) are pacifists p(x)" is more believ- 
able than argument "republicans r( x ) are not pacifists --1 p( x )". 
These statements are amenable to the following representation. 
S(q,p)  A S(r,-~p) A ((r , -~p) -< (q,p)) .  
From this formula, the desirable results under different presence of 
evidence can be derived. In case we know only that a person is a quaker, 
then only support S(q, p) is applicable, so we derive that he is a pacifist. In 
case we know nothing but that a person is a republican, similarly, we 
derive that he is not a pacifist. In case we know that a person is both a 
quaker and a republican as Nixson, both S(q, p) and S(r, p) is triggered 
and both conclusions pacifist and -~ pacifist are supported. But since the 
former support is stronger than the latter, the conclusion pacifist is 
supported better and thus our conclusion is that this person is a pacifist. 
EXAMPLE 7 Birds fly but not penguins. Birds have legs but not legless 
ones. 
These statements are represented as follows. Notice that "penguins are 
birds" and "legless birds are birds" are not represented as arguments but 
as implication relationships in ~e" 
Te( p ~ b) A Te( legless ~ b) 
AS(b , f )  A S(b, leg) 
A S ( p, -7 f )  A S ( legless, ~ leg ) 
From the formula above, we can conclude that penguin cannot fly but can 
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still have their legs and legless birds have no legs but can still fly. In [5], 
default strength is addressed by associating integers with defaults and a 
system Z ÷ is proposed. But Z ÷ has many faults even though it is to be 
commended for addressing the strengths of defaults. For example, in 
example 6, Z ÷ cannot represent he situation where p and r are not 
comparable because all integers are comparable. This is caused by the fact 
that all integers are comparable, which renders all arguments comparable. 
In example 7, this very reason will cause that "penguins have legs" and 
"legless birds fly" cannot be derivable from the same representation. We 
believe that ~WS", by avoiding these problems, is better than Z + in 
modeling strengths of defaults. 
The following is a longer example for which we not only present he 
representation, but also describe the evidence structure derived and the 
process of evidence accumulation and decision making. 
EXAMPLE 8 Let { Al t, Al2, AI 3} be three alternatives. 
Test el, if positive, supports Al I and Al 2. 
Test e 2, if positive, refutes All; if negative, supports Al 1. 
These facts can be represented as the following formula ({A/1} etc. is 
shortened to Al 1 etc.) Refer to example 1 and example 3 for the intuitive 
meaning of the representations below. 
S((el, All))  
A S((e 1, At2) ) 
A S((-1 e2, Al l )  ) 
A((e 2, All)  = (e2,0p)) 
A Vp(~Tp(AI,-- -+p) ~ (e i ,A l  ,) -.< (e2,p)) .  
From this formula, an evidence structure g:S:= (~e,~p,a¢ ,~)  can be 
derived as follows. 
"~e = 2{et'e2}; 
_~p = 2{Alt,AI2,Al3}; 
J = { (e , ,{A l l} )  , (el,{Al2}) 
(e2, { A/l}), { -1 e2, {AI2} ), (~  e 2 , { AI3} )}, 
~' = 4'. 
Notice that we have no information about the strengths of the arguments 
(other than that derivable from the subset relations in ~e and @). 
From the evidence structure, relationships among conclusions with 
respect o evidential support under different presentations of evidence is 
shown in the diagrams below. After the first case, the subset relation is 
omitted for clarity. The diagrams hould be treated as a tree where the 
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thick lines, together with depth, represent the differences of relative 
believabilities. 
el negative and e 2 negative The diagram shows that {A/l} is more 
believable than {Al2, Al  3} whereas the {AI 2} and {AI 3} are not comparable. 
Other relationships like {Al 1} is more believable than {Al2} and {A/3} are 
also represented. 
A12 V ,413 
.413 
e I negative and e 2 positive AI 1 is refuted by e 2, which makes {AI 1} less 
believable than either {Al 2} or {AI3}. So we have the following diagram (in 
which the subset relation is omitted). 
.412~~/A/~ .41z 
e 1 positive and e 2 negative In this case, Al 1 is supported by both e I and 
--~ e2; A l  e is supported only by el; and Al  3 commands no support at all, as 
shown in the following diagram. 
All 
At2 
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Both e 1 and e 2 are positive In this case, Al  e is supported by el: 
although Al  1 is also supported by el, it is also refuted by e 2 which makes it 
less believable than Al  2 but not comparable with Al  3 which has no 
support. 
.41~ 
It can be seen that if we also know that e I is more trustworthy than e2, (or 
vice versa), then in the last case we will be able to say that AI  1 is more 
believable than Al  3 (or vice versa). It is a surprise that even this informa- 
tion of relative strength is not always needed. In the example above, this 
information makes no difference in the first three cases. 
4.2. Bel ief Funct ionmConst ruct ing  Evidence 
D-S theory [19], ie, the method of probabilistic reasoning using belief 
functions, is one of the most important methods of evidential reasoning. It 
was intended to be used for modeling "the strength of evidence" and the 
resulting method is an extension of using probabilities by allowing assign- 
ment of beliefs to supersets without any commitments to their subsets. 
Notice that by assigning degrees of belief, evidential supports have already 
been linked to and conveyed to conclusions, ie, the evidence itself (one of 
the two parts of evidential support), is not represented. 
It is important o note that Shafer's analysis of the strength of evidence 
and his exposition of the evidential reasoning method are not one and the 
same. However, the reasoning method does provide an appropriate mathe- 
matical tool and it reflects Shafer's analysis. We will find that Shafer's 
analysis of evidence strength emphasizes that complete beliefs is the result 
of a process of construction of evidence from simple evidence (beliefs). 
Comparing,,q'g~5: to D-S theory, we can see two things directly. 
1. ~5:  is similar to D-S theory in that they have quite similar basic 
elements. Simple beliefs 5 in D-S theory are arguments in,gZ~5: (with 
their sources, ie, presumptions, explicated). 
2. ~5:  is different from D-S theory in that D-S theory is based on 
the assumption that a numerical function on 2 ° (where 0 is the 
domain for discussion) is sufficient o represent the absolute vidence 
strengths (belief degrees), whereas ~WZ: has no such assumptions 
5 Such as "there is reason to support conclusion A to degree s" which can be represented as
a simple belief function. 
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but uses relationships between arguments to represent their relative 
strengths. 
It can be shown that the idea of belief construction where complicated 
beliefs are constructed from simple beliefs can be reflected in ~g 'S :  [1], 
despite its difference from D-S theory. We have shown that we can use 
,9~g'S ~ representation to follow the belief construction process describe in 
[211. 
In addition. We have also established there the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2 I f  only making choices with respect o evidential support is 
concerned, all belief unctions can be represented as~q~S a formulae. • 
In fact we have shown that if making choices among alternative conclu- 
sions is our only concern, belief functions are equivalent to a particular 
kind of relations which can be represented usingoO/'g'5 p. The definitions of 
equivalence in this sense and the kind of relations in mind are given as 
follows. 
DEFINITION Two representations of evidence are sam to be equivalent iff 
they always choose the same propositions among an arbitrary set of proposi- 
tions. 
DVFINITION A relation ~a~ on 2 ° (denoted by 4 ) is called a B-relation if 
and only if 
1. J~ is universal, ie, VAa, A 2, ~ 2 °, we have A a ~ A 2 or A 2 ~ A 1 or 
both; 
2. ~9~ is transitive, ie, VA1, A2, A 3 E 2 0, i ra  1 ~ A 2 andA 2 _< A3, then 
A 1 ~ A3; 
3. ~9~ is consistent with the subset relation ~,  ie, VA1, A 2 ~ 2 °, if 
A 1 c_A2, thenA 1 ~A2; and 
4. ~9~ is semi-cumulative in the sense that: if both A 1 and A 2 are 
differential points of ~q~, then A 1 U A 2 is a different point of ~gL 
Where a differential point of JZ is a non-empty subset A such that for any 
proper subset A' of A, we have 
It should be noticed that B-relations can be represented in ,,q'~,9 ~that 
they are in fact a very special kind of #~g'5" relations. To represent 
B-relations in oq'~5: we restrict our evidence space to contain one and 
only one sentence thus the relationships between arguments are degen- 
erated to be relationships among conclusions. Then we add the condi- 
tons for B-relations in the definition above as further axioms. Also 
notice that the second and third conditions are derivable from the 
axioms for#~'~5 '~. They are included for the integrity of the definition of 
B-relations. 
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THEOREM 3 For an arbitrary belief unction Bel, there is one and only one 
B-relation that is equivalent to it. And for an arbitrary B-relation, there are 
belief unctions that are equivalent to it. • 
4.3. Canonical Examples--For Absolute Measures 
In Sharer [21], it is stated that the procedure of assessing subject 
probabilities (as well as degrees of belief) is no more than a course of 
comparing the evidence in a problem with the theory's scales (canonical 
examples) and picking out the canonical example that matches it best. In 
fact, using statistical information involves a quite similar procedure of 
comparing which converts the ratios in statistical experiments (or observa- 
tions) into probabilities. There are some presumptions of doing so, ie, the 
properties of the particular kind of measures (probabilities or other kind 
of measures) are taken as granted. In ~9/'g'S:, this procedure of comparing 
and the implied assumptions can be explicated. This provides a way to 
represent in ~q~8"5: many kinds of uncertainty measures. 
For ~S:  to represent any kind of uncertainty measure, first, a set of 
canonical examples is introduced. For example, for measures ranging over 
[0, 1], we can suppose that there is a set of propositions M m = {Mrlr 
[0, 1]} and a piece of evidence EM. Then, a canonical example for measure 
r will be represented as an argument (E  M, M r). 
Second, we represent he fact that an argument is of a special kind, ie, 
the kind associated with the set of canonical examples. This requires us to 
introduce another predicate M(a) that specifies that argument a is an 
argument of the particular kind. 
Here, we might want to have some conventions uch "evidence e is a 
piece of evidence of the given kind" that can be represented M(e) which is 
Vp e .~p(M((e ,  p))) .  
Third, assertions about measures, such as "the measure for A under 
evidence e is r", are represented by confirming that (e, A ) i s  an argument 
of the given kind and it is of the same strength as canonical example 
(EM, Mr), ie, 
m( (e ,  A))  A ((e, A)  = (EM, Mr)). 
For simplicity, in the following we will denote the assertion above as 
M((e,A))  = r and we will denote (E  M, M r) as r if doing so causes no 
confusion. 
Notice that when we make the assertion M((e, A)) = r, the implied 
requirements for the canonical examples hould be applied. These require- 
ments, in ~g: ,  can be introduced as axioms associated with predicate M. 
Different requirements will give us different kinds of measures. 
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For example, the following basic requirements are common for many 
uncertainty representation methods. 
• M((e,0p))  = 0; 
• (EM, M r) ~ (EM, M s) iff r < s; and 
• M(e) ---) Vp3r (m(e ,p)  = r). 
In practice, the last requirement is often dropped. 
Adding more requirements will give us some measures that are well 
established in the literature. We regard them as being interesting. For 
example, if we also require: 
Tp(A A1 n A2) 
A (M( (e ,  A I)) = r) 
A (M( (e ,  A2) ) = s) 
A( r  ~ s) ~ (M( (e ,A) )  = r). 
It is easy to see that the resulting measures are certainty measures [18]. 
Similarly, for belief functions we need among others the following 
requirements [19]. 
TA A u 
A Tp(A 1 (-I A 1 o Op) 
• A(M( (e ,  A1) ) = sl) 
A (m((e ,  A2) ) = s2) 
A(M((e ,A) )  =s)  ~s  I +s  2~s;  
• M( (e ,  lp) )  = 1. 
Using probabilities also implies the requirements for belief functions. 
Furthermore, it also requires that 
(M( (e ,  A ) )  = r) 
• A (M( (e ,B) )  = s) 
A Tp(A AB oOp)  ~ (M( (e ,A  UB) )  =r+s)  
Using probabilities implies more requirements than using belief functions. 
In this sense, belief functions are a generalization of probabilities. But 
more requirements do not always mean deficiency. In fact, it has been 
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widely noticed in literature that there are some patterns of uncertain 
reasoning that should be represented using probabilities. 
In ~g '5  p, because we are dealing with arguments that represent heir 
assumption statements explicitly, conditioning is represented by definition. 
This provides a natural way for representing conditional independence. 
For example, the statement that "A is independent of e 2 given el" can be 
represented generally as 
VB ~£Fp(((e I A e 2, A) * (e 1 A e 2, B) ~ (el, A) ~< (e 1, B)) 
A ( (e  1 A e2, B )  ~ (e 1 A e 2, A )  *-, (e 1, B )  ~ (e 1, A ) ) ) .  
With canonical examples as measures, the above definition can be modi- 
fied as 
M(<e,, A>) A M(<e 1 A e 2,A>) A (<e,, A) = <E M,Mr) ) 
<e I A e2, A> = <EM,Mr>. 
5. SUMMARY 
We have proposed a new method, ~S~,  for representing uncertain 
information based on representing arguments and their relative strengths. 
The method is formalized as a first-order predicate and examples are given 
showing how ~g '~ can be used to represent different kinds of uncertain 
information. 
We summarize the features of ~5 ~ in the following section. And in 
section 5.2. we list some topics for further studies. 
5.1. Features o f~ 'g~ 
After above exposition of ~'g'S p and illustrations of using ~S p to 
represent various kinds of uncertain information, the following desirable 
features o f .9~'~ become clear. 
• In ~S p, all three aspects of an argument--namely, its presumption, 
conclusion, and strength--are represented. 
• Relative strengths of arguments, which are at a lower level of abstrac- 
tion than that of numerical measures, are represented. 
• ~ '~5 '~ is capable of representing the process of building up compli- 
cated evidence structures. At the same time, the evidence structures 
of o~'g~S  are very intuitive because the design of evidence is repre- 
sented explicitly and no implicated calculations are embodied. 
228 Z. An et al. 
• Many kinds of absolute measures can also be represented, even 
though only relative strengths of arguments are represented directly. 
In fact, ~'g'S~' representations of absolute measures have the merit 
that presumptions of using different kinds of measures are explicitly 
represented. At the same time, we cannot see any obvious way of 
representing relative strengths using any method based on absolute 
measures, because sometimes such information is not available and 
sometimes absolute measures are inappropriate even when they are 
available (eg, in example 7). 
• Lastly, 9~'g'S: provides a natural base on which to build a hybrid 
system in which different kinds of uncertain information can be 
processed within a common framework. This is because ~9~'g'S: is
capable of representing many kinds of uncertain information, so that 
the whole system needs not to be tuned to any special kind of 
uncertain information. 
5.2. Further Studies 
Many aspects of,9~'~S: have not been discussed in this paper. Some of 
them are listed now. 
• We have shown that relative strengths i at a lower level of abstraction 
than that of numerical measures. Ranked judgments, eg, "this paper is 
ranked at grade 9 out of 10 grades," are at another level of abstraction 
and are very widely used to judge argument strengths. We think that 
incorporating ranked judgments with relative judgments will issue a 
very flexible and practical method. 
• One phenomenon of uncertainty in reasoning is non-monotonic. It 
should be very interesting to see how different kinds of non-mono- 
tonicity can be reflected in ,9~'g'~. We conjecture that ~q'~S: will be 
able to provide some insights into certain problems encountered with 
current methods for non-monotonic reasoning. 
• Knowledge acquisition certainly will be better off with~'~S ° than with 
the alternatives because relationships in ~a~S: have very intuitive 
meanings. But for a complicated evidence structures, combinations 
have the potential to explode, using ranks might help. This can be 
supplemented by a computer aid that can answer questions uch as 
"how can the given two sets of altematives be distinguished," and 
thereby guide users to assess the required relationships. 
• Structure information provides away to avoid combination explosions. 
Thus, it will be very advantageous to combine,9~g'S ° with networks. 
We are expecting more interesting results from our further studies. But 
from what we have presented, our conclusion is that ,9~'g'S '~ offers a new 
and well justified approach to dealing with uncertain information, and has 
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provided a suitable representation and reasoning method for use with 
uncertain information. 
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